Book Review: The Logic of Political Survival, by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow by Starr, Harvey
University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications Political Science, Department of
5-2005
Book Review: The Logic of Political Survival, by
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith,
Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow
Harvey Starr
University of South Carolina, starr-harvey@sc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/poli_facpub
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Book Review is brought to you by the Political Science, Department of at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Publication Info
Published in Journal of Politics, ed. Jan E. Leighley, William Mishler, Volume 67, Issue 2, 2005, pages 607-609.
Starr, H. (2005). The logic of political survival. [Review of the book The logic of political survival, by B. Bueno de Mesquita, A. Smith, R.
M. Siverson, & J. D. Morrow]. Journal of Politics, 67(2), 607-609.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00331_7.x
© Journal of Politics, 2005, Cambridge University Press
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=JOP
The Tragic Vision of Politics is an impressive and humanistic work character-
ized by wide reading in history, philosophy and the classics. It represents a pow-
erful revival and reinterpretation of the classical realist tradition. Indeed, the very
design of the book draws upon the methods of Lebow’s classical sources, illus-
trating nuanced practical and moral lessons through vivid historical example. One
of the interesting features of the book is Lebow’s own recognition that each clas-
sical author is open to multiple readings. Many contemporary realists will no
doubt point to elements in the work of Thucydides, Clausewitz and Morgenthau
that are not emphasized by Lebow. For example, Clausewitz was concerned by
the specter of modern warfare—but he also stressed that war is a legitimate tool
of state policy. Morgenthau applauded traditional ethical constraints on the use
of force—but he also insisted on what he called the moral dignity of the national
interest, while asserting that moral pronouncements in foreign policy are gener-
ally self-interested rationalizations on the part of each political actor. Lebow’s
work is subtle and candid enough to admit these tensions and contradictions. But
if classical realists such as Clausewitz and Morgenthau have been misinterpreted
as straightforward proponents of realpolitik, it is because they often sound that
way in their own work.
One tension that is harder to contain lies in Lebow’s critique of modern realism
for its supposed impact on American foreign policy. On the one hand, Lebow crit-
icizes contemporary realists for sheltering themselves from current policy debates
within the arcane world of systems theory. On the other hand, he criticizes them
for having a major, negative impact on American diplomacy, in that narrow self-
interest has been elevated above considerations of justice or even prudence. But
surely these two criticisms cannot both be true. It seems more likely, to this
reviewer at least, that contemporary forms of academic realism have had very
little influence on the actual conduct of American diplomacy. Indeed, modern
realists such as Kenneth Waltz have openly and consistently warned against the
dangers of aggressive idealism and over-ambition in America’s post-Cold War
foreign policy—to little avail. Contemporary academic realists come to their
policy recommendations by a different route than Lebow, but most of them would
probably not disagree with his ultimate conclusion: that Americans better avoid
the dangers of hubris and over-expansion, if they do not want to go the way of
ancient Athens.
Colin Dueck, University of Colorado
The Logic of Political Survival. By Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith,
Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2003. Pp. 536. $40.00.)
This sprawling and impressive book is the product of a project that reaches
back over a decade. Exemplifying the growing trend to cross-over and blur the
lines between international and comparative politics, this book crosses levels of
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analysis by dealing with two-level games as well as investigating the interactions
among politics, economics, and the foreign policy making process (all within a
context of democratic theory). Not a quick or easy read, this volume is rich in
theory, data, and the empirical analysis of key questions in international and com-
parative politics. Its multiple methods approach includes formal models, quanti-
tative data analysis, an extensive use of historical cases (the Magna Carta, the
evolution of governance in Sparta, eunuchs in the Tang dynasty, the Caliphate
following the death of Muhammad, Mamluk Egypt, terms limits in the Roman
Republic and Athens, Leopold II’s rule in Belgium and the Congo, kleptocracy
in Mobutu’s Zaire, etc.), and draws upon a number of political philosophers
(including Toqueville, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Madison, and especially
Hobbes). As such, this review can only provide some feel for what the reader will
find in its pages.
This research is an exemplar of a coherent, theoretically driven, developed, and
productive research program, which was “begun a decade ago, start[ing] as a
narrow investigation of the consequences of war for the political survival of
regimes and leaders” (xi). This project also illustrates the set of feedback loops
among theory, logic, and inductive and deductive strategies, eventuating in an
elegant formal model that explains the broader question of how political leaders
allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders affect a whole range
of domestic and foreign policy choices. The authors have created a basic theory
that, in Lakatosian terms, accounts for much in the extant comparative and inter-
national politics literatures but with excess empirical and theoretical content.
Their comparative theory of political-system change is “motivated by the notion
that leaders want to keep their positions of power and privilege” (24). In sum,
they have provided “an explanation of when bad policy is good politics, and when
good policy is bad politics” (xii).
The “essence of the argument”—a theory of political incentives developed into
a model of the selectorate–is introduced in Chapter 1 and fully developed in
Chapters 2 and 3. The authors argue: “Political leaders need to hold office in order
to accomplish any goal . . . We take it as axiomatic that everyone in a position of
authority wants to keep that authority and that it is the maneuvering to do so that
is central to politics in any type of regime . . . We treat political survival as a nec-
essary, but not a sufficient, condition for leaders to achieve other personal objec-
tives” (7, 9, 23). The model is based on the reality that every leader is kept in
power by some group of sufficient size (the “winning coalition”) to prevail over
the rest of the “selectorate” in addition to the disenfranchised. The building blocks
of the model include the leadership, winning coalition, and selectorate, plus the
residents of the polity and any challenger to the leadership. Thus:
Leaders, all of whom face challengers who wish to depose them, maintain their
coalitions of supporters by taxing and spending in ways that allocate mixes of
public and private goods. The nature of the mix depends on the size of the
winning coalition, while the total amount spent depends both on the size of the
selectorate and on the winning coalition (37).
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The logic of the model leads to what I think is its central dynamic—that “the
size of the winning coalition determines whether policies have a public or private
focus” (104). The chapters in Part II, “Policy Choice and Political Survival,” and
Part III, “Choosing Institutions,” present empirical tests of a wide range of impli-
cations generated by the theory. For example, Chapter 4 shows how institutions
may provide incentives for either kleptocracy or economic growth. As almost all
of these analyses do, the results presented in this chapter touch on the impact of
democracy, those states with the largest selectorates and winning coalitions.
Results here indicate that dependence on a large coalition does promote eco-
nomically productive activities, whereas the small coalitions of authoritarian gov-
ernments promote kleptocracy. In Chapter 6, “War, Peace, and Coalition Size,” a
dyadic selectorate model is developed, which expands on earlier work of Bueno
de Mesquita and Lalman and complements much of the extant democratic peace
literature by demonstrating the effects of the size of the winning coalition on
policy choices. Chapter 7, “Political Survival,” returns to the initial question of
governmental survival, concluding that, “for those who depend on a small coali-
tion, good policy is bad politics and bad policy is good politics” (302). Chapter
8 deals with change from within: dealing with oppression, civil war, revolution,
purges, and coups. Chapter 9 looks at the relationship between war and the sur-
vival of regimes, and especially how the selectorate model influences war aims.
The final chapter looks at “Promoting Peace and Prosperity.” Creating an origi-
nal and highly useful measure of social welfare—the Hobbes Index—the authors
conclude: “The political transition from a society ruled by an exclusive group to
one with a broad, inclusive coalition structure appears to be fundamental for sus-
tained improvement in the quality of life for the world’s economically, socially,
or politically oppressed peoples” (485).
The authors see their model as a basic template, and at several points 
express the hope that it will be elaborated upon. With results such as those 
briefly noted here, this is a worthwhile enterprise indeed. All students of inter-
national politics and foreign policy as well as comparative politics should be
encouraged to read this book, and mine its riches in aid of their own research
programs.
Harvey Starr, University of South Carolina
Silent Voices: Public Opinion and Political Participation in America. By Adam
Berinsky. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pp. 224.
$35.00).
As the fields of political behavior and public opinion mature and a consensus
builds about what counts as valid research, it becomes more difficult for schol-
ars to make a lasting impact. While incremental increases in knowledge are likely
to made, very little research actually challenges the underlying methodological
framework generating that knowledge. It is relatively rare to find scholars who
Book Reviews 609
